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COMMENTS
Consumer Preferences for Sex and Title VII:
Employing Market Definition Analysis for
Evaluating BFOQ Defenses
Rachel L. Cantort
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex dis-
crimination in employment;1 however, Title VII also provides an
exception called the bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ")
exception or defense.2 The BFOQ exception permits employers to
make hiring decisions based on otherwise prohibited reasons,
such as sex, if such decisions are necessary to the "essence of the
business."3 For example, the BFOQ exception permits hospitals to
hire nurses on the basis of gender because respecting the privacy
interests of patients is essential to the business of running a hos-
pital.4 In contrast, because gender is not essential to the business
of transporting passengers, gender is not a BFOQ for the position
of airline attendant.5
Title VII protects both men and women from discrimination
in employment.' In one instance, a group of men who sought and
were denied employment at Hooters, a restaurant chain known
for employing attractive women, brought a sex discrimination
suit against the chain.7 The plaintiffs alleged that Hooters vio-
lated Title VII by refusing to hire men for "front of the house"
positions such as serving, bartending and hosting In granting
t B.S. 1995, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Chicago.
' 42 USC §§ 2000e-2 et seq (1994). Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, and national origin. Id. All references to Title VII in this
Comment refer to Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination.
2 42 USC § 2000e-2(e).
' See Part I C.
See, for example, Healey v Southwood Psychiatric Hospital, 78 F3d 128, 133-34 (3d
Cir 1996). See also Part I D 1.
' See, for example, Diaz v Pan American World Airways, Inc, 442 F2d 385, 388 (5th
Cir 1971); Wilson v Southwest Airlines Co, 517 F Supp 292, 302-04 (N D Tex 1981). See
also Part I D 3.
6 See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co v EEOC, 462 US 669, 682 (1983).
Latuga v Hooters, Inc, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 4169, *1 (N D Ill).
' Id.
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the group's motion for class certification, the district court identi-
fied the validity of the defendant's BFOQ defense as one of the
main issues to be considered in a future trial.'
The BFOQ exception is difficult to apply when, as with the
Hooters case, consumer preferences for an employee of a specific
sex appear to be at issue and the essence of the business in ques-
tion is unclear. Practically speaking, Hooters is somewhere be-
tween a strip club, where hiring only a single sex is permitted,
and a restaurant, where hiring only a single sex is prohibited. 10
Although the validity of Hooters's BFOQ defense was never de-
termined because the parties settled, the claim is interesting be-
cause it exemplifies the difficult relation between Title VII's
BFOQ defense and consumer preferences."
Despite a presumption in the law against permitting BFOQ
defenses based on consumer preferences, 2 courts applying the
"essence of the business" test often rule in favor of such defenses.
A closer look indicates that courts uphold sex-based BFOQ de-
fenses when sex is essential to a business's continued participa-
tion in a certain market, that is, when sex determines the rele-
vant market." When consumer preferences for sex are strong
enough, sex (1) becomes a product (2) for which consumers are
willing to pay." But how can courts determine when sex is the
product?
Defining the market in which a business competes helps de-
termine whether "sex" is a business's product. If the alleged sex
Id at *6-7.
See text accompanying notes 86-89.
See Hooters Agrees to Hire Men in Support Roles; But It Will Still Hire Scantily
Clad Women, Balt Sun 3C (wire reports) (Oct 1, 1997) (discussing the Hooters settlement
which created support jobs, such as hosts and bartenders, that would be filled without
reference to gender).
2 The EEOC claims that consumer preferences cannot justify employment decisions,
29 CFR § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (see note 33 and accompanying text), and courts hold that con-
sumer preferences justify BFOQ defenses only in limited instances. See, for example,
Wilson v Southwest Airlines Co, 517 F Supp 292, 299 (N D Tex 1981) (collecting cases).
"s This Comment will mainly refer to "sex" and not "gender." Although both "sex" and
"gender" can indicate the specific gender of an individual, the word "sex" can be used to
capture "gender" plus something else, or sex as sexuality. In particular, it makes less
sense to think of markets in gender than it does to think of markets in sex. Examples of
markets in sex are strip clubs and calendars of attractive men. It is difficult to think of a
market in gender that is not just a manifestation of the kind of gender discrimination
Title VII seeks to prohibit.
" This will undoubtedly disturb many Title VII supporters. It appears to allow em-
ployers to make an end run around Title VII by defining their business through the sale of
sex. However, the purpose of Title VII is not to eliminate selling sex, but to eliminate
discrimination in employment. See Part I C. Title VII does not control whatemployers
sell; rather, it controls what factors employers use to make employment decisions.
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discrimination occurs in every firm that competes in the market,
then sex is likely a defining characteristic of the market, essen-
tial to the business, and thus a BFOQ for employment. Although
Title VII offers no help in defining markets, antitrust law de-
pends upon such determinations and developed around precisely
these types of considerations.15 Consequently, the economic prin-
ciples and market definition techniques employed in antitrust
law can help determine the "essence" of a particular business and
can help assess the validity of an employer's BFOQ defense.
Part I of this Comment discusses Title VII in general. It
briefly introduces the legislative history and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission's role in enforcing Title VII. Sub-
parts C and D of Part I elucidate the different tests courts use to
evaluate BFOQ defenses and the different classes of cases in
which courts generally find BFOQ defenses valid or invalid. Part
I concludes that all gender-specific employment decisions, those
found invalid under the BFOQ exception as well as those found
valid, are somehow based on consumer preferences.
Part II discusses the basic economics of the BFOQ exception
and introduces the law's relationship to preferences and social
welfare. Part III proceeds on the premise that Title VII law can-
not properly evaluate its own "essence of the business" test in
difficult cases where the product in question combines sex and
something else. Consequently, the Section discusses the econom-
ics of pricing and introduces antitrust law's market definition
techniques to demonstrate how to evaluate difficult BFOQ
claims. Part III concludes that Title VII should require a market
definition analysis in difficult cases. Ultimately, if the defendant
can prove that sex defines the market in which the defendant
competes - by examining the specific product's pricing structure
and the cross-elasticities of demand to other products - then the
defendant can properly assert that sex is a BFOQ for employ-
ment.
I. TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964s provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any in-
" For a general overview of antitrust law, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust
Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice (West 1994).
" Codified at 42 USC §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
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dividual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 7
Section 703(e)"8 of Title VII dictates that it is not unlawful for an
employer to make an employment decision "on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or nation origin is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that par-
ticular business or enterprise." 9 Thus, although Title VII gener-
ally prohibits discrimination in employment, in specific circum-
stances it permits such discrimination.
Under Title VII, once a plaintiff proves a prima facie case of
employment discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to
show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment
practices at issue.2" If the employer shows that the challenged
practice is based on a bona fide occupational qualification,2 then
the employer will meet its burden and no Title VII violation will
be found to exist.22
A. Legislative History
The legislative history of Title VII's prohibition against sex
discrimination is markedly sparse.23 The drafters of the contro-
versial Civil Rights Bill originally sought to remedy race dis-
crimination in employment.' On the last day of the House hear-
ings on the Civil Rights Bill, an opponent of the Bill attempted to
prevent the Bill's approval by proposing that the law be broad-
Id at § 2000e-2(a).
Id at § 2000e-2(e).
Id.
McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 802-04 (1973). The elements of a
prima facie case under Title VII are: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the suspect class at
issue, (2) the plaintiff applied for and was qualified for a job, (3) for which the plaintiff was
denied employment, and (4) after the plaintiff was denied employment the employer con-
tinued to seek similarly qualified individuals for that position. Id at 802. See also Fesel v
Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc, 447 F Supp 1346, 1349 (D Del 1978).
2 Where the employer's practice is overtly discriminatory a BFOQ defense may be
asserted. However, if the employer's practice is facially neutral but results in a discrimi-
natory practice the judicially created "business necessity" test applies. See, for example,
Gunther v Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F2d 1079, 1086 n 8 (8th Cir 1980) (discuss-
ing this difference while acknowledging the similarity of the two tests).
Chambers v Omaha Girls Club, Inc, 834 F2d 697, 703 (8th Cir 1987).
See Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupa-
tional Qualification, 55 Tex L Rev 1025, 1027 (1977).
" Id.
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ened to prohibit "sex" discrimination in employment.25 The at-
tempt to thwart the Bill failed; the amendment passed with the
proposed change.2"
There is correspondingly little legislative history on the
BFOQ exception to Title VII.27 Courts often rely on an Interpreta-
tive Memorandum of Title VII - submitted by the Senate Floor
Managers of the Civil Rights Bill - to determine congressional
intent with regard to the BFOQ exception.29 The Interpretive
Memorandum stressed that the BFOQ exception was meant to
give employers a "limited right to discriminate... where the rea-
son for the discrimination is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion."30 The Interpretive Memorandum gives examples of facially
discriminatory hiring policies that might be acceptable under the
BFOQ exception, such as the preference of an ethnic restaurant
to hire a cook of the same ethnicity or the preference of a profes-
sional sports team to hire male players."
B. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
In order to enforce the provisions created by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Congress created the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission ("EEOC").2 Although EEOC guidelines do not
bind courts, courts afford them "great deference" in deciding em-
ployment discrimination cases.3
EEOC regulations state that the BFOQ exception "should be
interpreted narrowly" with regard to sex.3' The Commission lists
See Bujel v Borman Food Stores, Inc, 384 F Supp 141, 144 n 4 (E D Mich 1974);
Sirota, 55 Tex L Rev at 1027 (cited in note 23).
110 Cong Rec 2584 (Feb 8, 1964).
See Wilson v Southwest Airlines Co, 517 F Supp 292, 297 n 12 (N D Tex 1981)
(noting that the House barely discussed the application of the BFOQ exception to sex
discrimination because sex was not added to Title VII until the final stages of delibera-
tion).
' Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII of HR 7152 Submitted by Senators Jo-
seph S. Clark and Clifford P. Case, Floor Mangers, in 110 Cong Rec S 7212 (Apr 8, 1964).
' Southwest, 517 F Supp at 297. See also Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321, 334
(1977) (citing the Interpretative Memorandum in support of the conclusion that the BFOQ
defense is "extremely narrow"); Swint v Pullman-Standard, 624 F2d 525, 535 (5th Cir
1980) (citing same for the proposition that customer preferences might be a factor for
determining the validity of a BFOQ defense).
110 Cong Rec at S 7213; Southwest, 517 F Supp at 297.
110 Cong Rec at S 7213; Southwest, 517 F Supp at 297.
42 USC § 2000e-4(a).
See Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424, 433-34 (1971). But see General Electric
Co v Gilbert, 429 US 125, 140-45 (1976) (declining to follow an EEOC guideline because
the guideline was not created at the same time as the Civil Rights Act, yet noting that
courts should generally defer to EEOC guidelines).
29 CFR § 1604.2(a) (1998).
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many situations in which refusing to hire an individual will not
merit a BFOQ exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based
on assumptions of the comparative employment charac-
teristics of women in general.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereo-
typed characterizations of the sexes.
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the pref-
erences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers."
Indeed, the Commission explicitly recognizes only one in-
stance in which sex can be a bona fide occupational qualification:
"Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuine-
ness, the Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification, e.g., an actor or actress."" EEOC decisions
concerning the merits of specific BFOQ defenses evidence the
Commission's narrow interpretation of the defense in general."
C. Assessing BFOQ Defenses: Defining the Employer's Business
Courts construe an employer's bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation defense narrowly." Title VII specifically limits BFOQ de-
fenses to instances where discrimination is (1) reasonably neces-
sary to (2) the "normal operation" of the "particular" business.39
Although courts use several different methods to evaluate an em-
Id at § 1604.2(aX1).
"' Id at § 1604.2(2).
" See, for example, EEOC Decision No 82-4 (1982) (finding that defendant's failure
to transfer female plaintiff to a higher position in a male unit of a youth home violated
Title VII; no BFOQ defense could be established on the basis of inmate privacy interests,
safety concerns, or the claim that women can not serve as "role models" for young male
detainees, in part, because women had successfully filled the disputed position in the
past); EEOC Decision No 71-2338 (1971) (finding that a customer's preference for accom-
paniment by a male employee to football games, hunting trips, and dinners did not justify
the employer's refusal to promote a woman to branch manager); EEOC Decision No 70-11
(1969) (finding that perceived customer lack of confidence in female courier guard did not
justify employer's decision to hire only men).
' See United Auto Workers v Johnson Controls, Inc, 499 US 187, 201 (1991) ("The
BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it narrowly."); Dothard v
Rawlinson, 433 US 321, 334 (1977) ("the bfoq exception was in fact meant to be an ex-
tremely narrow exception"); EEOC v HI 40 Corp, 953 F Supp 301, 305 (W D Mo 1996). But
see Sirota, 55 Tex L Rev at 1032 (cited in note 23) (noting that the legislative history indi-
cates that Congress intended to create a broad BFOQ exception for sex discrimination).
42 USC § 2000e-2(e).
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ployer's BFOQ defense,4" all of the methods ultimately focus on
the character, or "essence," of the defendant's business. 41
The most frequently applied test is the "essence of the busi-
ness" test announced by the Fifth Circuit in Diaz v Pan American
World Airways, Inc42 and later adopted by the Supreme Court in
Dothard v Rawlinson43 and United Auto Workers v Johnson Con-
trols, Inc.4" Under this test, a BFOQ defense is valid only if an
employer must discriminate between employees to ensure that a
job is performed.45 It follows that if an employee of either sex can
perform the job in dispute or properly carry out the functions of
the business, then an employer cannot discriminate between em-
ployees on the basis of sex.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Dothard and Johnson Con-
trols exemplify the different possible applications of the essence
of the business test. In Dothard, the Supreme Court looked to the
essence of the business test to find that sex is a BFOQ for em-
ployment in maximum security prisons in certain extreme situa-
tions.46 The "essence of a correctional counselor's job" is to main-
tain prison security.47 When 20 percent of prisoners in a state's
system are incarcerated for the commission of sexual crimes, it
follows that female guards are more likely to be attacked by pris-
oners." If female guards are more likely to be attacked by prison-
ers, then being female thwarts the goal of maintaining prison
security.49 On the other hand, in Johnson Controls the Supreme
Court applied the essence of the business test to reject an em-
ployer's BFOQ defense.5" In Johnson Controls, the employer at-
tempted to justify its policy of excluding fertile women from bat-
tery-production jobs on the grounds that the position required
, See, for example, Torres v Wisconsin Dept of Health and Social Services, 859 F2d
1523, 1527 (7th Cir 1988) (discussing the different formulations of the BFOQ exception).
See id at 1528 (emphasizing the importance of defining the defendant's "business").
4 442 F2d 385, 388 (5th Cir 1971).
433 US 321, 333 (1977).
499 US 187 (1991). Although the decision in Dothard does not clearly adopt the
essence of the business test, in Johnson Controls the Court stated that Dothard stresses
that a BFOQ must be related to the essence of an employee's job or to the "central mission
of the employer's business." Id at 203, quoting Western Air Lines, Inc v Criswell, 472 US
400, 413 (1985).
' Johnson Controls, 499 US at 201 ("By modifying 'qualification' with 'occupational,'
Congress narrowed the term to qualifications that affect an employee's ability to do the
job.").
433 US at 336-37.
Id at 335.
Id at 335-36.
49 Id.
' 499 US at 203-07.
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exposure to levels of lead dangerous to potential fetuses."1 Al-
though the Court found the employer's goal of protecting poten-
tial fetuses laudable, the Court ruled that fertility does not go to
the essence of battery making since fertility does not affect an
individual's ability to make batteries.52
Courts also evaluate an employer's BFOQ defense with the
"all or substantially all" standard. In Weeks v Southern Bell Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co,' the court announced this standard:
[T]he principle of nondiscrimination requires that ... in
order to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification
exception an employer has the burden of proving that he
had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for
believing, that all or substantially all women would be un-
able to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job
involved.54
I
Despite Southern Bell's concern that women were not strong
enough for the position at issue and that women should not be on
call past midnight, a necessity of the position, the court found
that the defendant failed to meet its burden of proving a BFOQ
defense. The defendant did not introduce evidence concerning
the lifting capabilities of women and the defendant already re-
quired women employed in other positions to be on call past mid-
night.5 Thus, the court ruled that Southern Bell failed to meet its
burden of proving that "all or substantially all" women could not
safely and efficiently perform the duties of a switchman."
Some courts hold that an employer asserting a BFOQ defense
must also demonstrate that "there are no reasonably available
alternative practices" that would eliminate the need to resort to
discriminatory policies.57 This requirement makes a BFOQ de-
fense exceptionally hard to prove: if there is any chance that the
employer can rearrange the work environment to accommodate
8' Id at 192.
Id at 203-04 ("No one can disregard the possibility of injury to future children; the
BFOQ, however, is not so broad that it transforms this deep social concern into an essen-
tial aspect of battery making.").
408 F2d 228 (5th Cir 1969).
Id at 235.
Id at 235-36 ("Title VII rejects just this type of romantic paternalism as unduly
Victorian and instead vests individual women with the power to decide whether or not to
take on unromantic tasks.").
Id at 235.
Gunther v Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F2d 1079, 1087 (8th Cir 1980). See
also Norwood v Dale Maintenance System, Inc, 590 F Supp 1410, 1415 (N D Ill 1984).
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the individuals discriminated against, then the employer must do
so regardless of inconvenience." For instance, in Forts v Ward,5 9
the court responded to prisoners' requests for an injunction
against assigning male guards to female housing units by order-
ing the prison to install shower screens and to provide sleeping
garments for inmates.e Although the court deferred to the in-
mates' legitimate privacy interests, it ruled that the inmates'
preference for sleeping nude did not overcome the more impor-
tant consideration of providing equal employment opportunities
for male guards. 1
All of the different tests employed by courts to evaluate
BFOQ defenses can be reconciled. 2 The BFOQ exception of Title
VII allows employers to make hiring decisions based on sex so
long as sex defines, at least in part, the product market of the
business in question.' If sex defines the product then: (1) sex is
the essence of the business; (2) all or reasonably all members of
the sex allegedly suffering discrimination cannot perform the po-
sition in question without changing the product's essential char-
acter and thus changing its market; and (3) no reasonably avail-
able alternative practices exist, except switching product markets
(or failing).
See Gunther, 612 F2d at 1087 ("Title VII requires administrative necessity, not
merely administrative inconvenience, to satisfy the bfoq exception.").
621 F2d 1210 (2d Cir 1980).
Id at 1216-17.
61 Id at 1217. See also Bohemian Club v Fair Employment and Housing Commission,
231 Cal Rptr 769, 782 (Cal App 1986) (citing Forts v Ward in support of its holding that
the privacy interests of members of an all male club did not justify the club's refusal to
hire female employees because enclosed shower and bathroom facilities were available).
But see Brooks v ACF Industries, Inc, 537 F Supp 1122, 1132 (S D W Va 1982) (finding
that sex was a BFOQ for janitorial duties in a male bathhouse because there was no "rea-
sonable scheme or accommodation that feasibly or reasonably could be implemented by
defendant" that could properly accommodate both the plaintiffs right to employment and
the customers' rights to privacy).
See, for example, Wilson v Southwest Airlines Co, 517 F Supp 292, 300 n 17 (N D
Tex 1981) (noting that the use of different tests to evaluate employer BFOQ defenses is
rarely outcome determinative).
See Torres, 859 F2d at 1528 (emphasizing the importance of defining the defen-
dant's "business": "[W]e must focus on the 'particular business' of the employer in which
the protected employee worked. Oftentimes, this task requires that a court recognize fac-
tors that make a particular operation of an employer unique or at least substantially dif-
ferent from other operations in the same general business or profession.") (citation omit-
ted).
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D. Valid and Invalid BFOQ Defenses: Measuring the Strength of
Consumer Preferences and Determining the Essence of the
Business
All of the methods for evaluating BFOQ defenses require a
market participation test: are sex-based employment policies nec-
essary for market participation? One way successfully to conduct
the market participation inquiry is to analyze the strength of
consumer preferences for the characteristic at issue. If consumer
preferences for a characteristic are sufficiently strong, failure to
meet consumer preferences will result in a failure of the business.
Conversely, if consumer preferences for a characteristic are not
sufficiently strong, failure to meet those preferences may result
in decreased business, but not in a failure of the business. Thus,
if a consumer preference for a characteristic is not sufficiently
strong, the characteristic is not essential to the business and
should not justify a BFOQ defense.
Every BFOQ defense relates to consumer preferences. How-
ever, even commonly accepted justifications for BFOQ defenses,
such as privacy interests and public welfare concerns, should fail
to validate BFOQ defenses when the underlying consumer pref-
erences are not strong enough to significantly affect market par-
ticipation. Case law supports this characterization of BFOQ de-
fenses: courts reject BFOQ defenses when accommodating the
consumer preference at issue is not essential to the business. Fi-
nally, case law shows that employers usually fail to establish
valid BFOQ defenses when the consumer preference at issue is
for a specific gender employee without some additional non-
gender justification, such as privacy or public welfare concerns.
1. A consumer's right to privacy.
Generally, employers can justify sex as a BFOQ when male
or female consumer rights to privacy are at issue" - this justifi-
cation can also be characterized as a consumer preference for pri-
vacy. This BFOQ was foreshadowed in the House discussions of
Title VII.5 For instance, privacy issues justify sex as a BFOQ
See Survey, Title VII - Sex Discrimination - Bona Fide Occupational Quality
Defense Affords Employers the Right to Consider Gender in Employment Policies Without
Illegally Discriminating Against Employees - Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78
F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1996), 26 Seton Hall L Rev 1779, 1783 (1996); Comment, Privacy as
Rationale for the Sex-Based BFOQ, 1985 Detroit Coil L Rev 865.
See 110 Cong Rec H 2718 (Feb 8, 1964) (statement of Rep Goodell, proposing to add
"sex" to the BFOQ section of Title VII: "There are so many instances where the matter of
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when employers assign nurses to different shifts in nursing
homes or assign orderlies to different departments in hospitals."e
Similarly, employers can assert valid sex-based BFOQ defenses
founded on customer privacy concerns when hiring janitors to
clean single-sex facilities. 7 A market participation inquiry helps
assess a BFOQ defense in customer privacy cases. For example, if
a hospital wishes to attract female clientele and to remain com-
petitive in the market for female patients, the hospital must be
allowed to accommodate consumer preferences for privacy by
hiring only female nurses in specific wards.
The strength of the alleged consumer preference for privacy
dictates whether privacy justifies a discriminatory hiring policy
and thus a BFOQ defense. For instance, in EEOC v HI 40 Corp,"
the court reviewed an employer's female-only hiring policy for
weight loss counselor positions.69 The court determined that "a
minimal intrusion on the privacy of customers must be tolerated
if the elimination of that intrusion 'tramples' the employment
opportunities" of another sex.7° The job of weight loss counselor
included taking body fat measurements, which was potentially
sex is a bona fide occupational qualification. For instance, I think of an elderly woman
who wants a female nurse.").
0 See, for example, Healey v Southwood Psychiatric Hospital, 78 F3d 128 (3d Cir
1996) (finding that the defendant hospital established a BFOQ defense for its policy of
considering sex when assigning shifts since the sex considerations were necessary to pro-
tect patient privacy); Jones v Hinds General Hospital, 666 F Supp 933, 935-37 (S D Miss
1987) (holding male gender a BFOQ that justified a hospital's decision to lay off only fe-
male nursing assistants due to a shortage of male orderlies needed to attend to male pa-
tients); Backus v Baptist Medical Center, 510 F Supp 1191, 1193-97 (E D Ark 1981)
(holding hospital's employment of only female nurses in obstetrics and gynecology de-
partment justified by a BFOQ defense based on the privacy concerns of patients), vacated
on other grounds, 671 F2d 1100 (8th Cir 1982); Fesel v Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc,
447 F Supp 1346, 1350-54 (D Del 1978) (holding that retirement home could justify its
female-only hiring policy for nurses on the privacy interests of the guests since twenty-two
of the thirty retirees were female and objected to male treatment).
' See Norwood v Dale Maintenance System, Inc, 590 F Supp 1410, 1416-17 (N D Ill
1984) (holding sex a BFOQ for day shift position as male washroom attendant); Brooks v
ACF Industries, Inc, 537 F Supp 1122, 1130-33 (S D W Va 1982) (holding employer's pol-
icy of hiring men to clean male bathhouse facilities justified on a BFOQ defense). Simi-
larly, the privacy rights of inmates, coupled with additional compelling reasons, may jus-
tify a sex-based BFOQ. See Robino v Iranon, 145 F3d 1109, 1110-11 (9th Cir 1998) (find-
ing gender a BFOQ which justified the correctional facility's policy of assigning only fe-
male workers to protect female inmates' privacy rights and to reduce the risk of sexual
assaults between employees and inmates); Tharp v Iowa Dept of Corrections, 68 F3d 223,
226 (8th Cir 1995) (upholding a prison's policy of allowing only female employees to staff a
women's unit of the prison on the grounds of inmate privacy, efficacy of rehabilitative
services and benefit to female employees).
953 F Supp 301 (W D Mo 1996).
Id at 304-05.
70 Id at 304.
504 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:
embarrassing to customers.71 Thus, some customers objected to
having their measurements taken by men.72 The court rejected HI
40 Corporation's allegation that customers preferred female
counselors and found that the alleged customer preference was
not supported by sound evidence.73 It followed that if a consumer
preference for female counselors could not be demonstrated, the
consumers did not have a privacy interest strong enough to sup-
port the finding of a sex based BFOQ. The court's finding of a Ti-
tle VII violation reflected the strength of the consumer prefer-
ences at issue.74
2. Public welfare.
Public welfare concerns, such as safety, can also justify sex-
based BFOQ defenses. In Dothard v Rawlinson,75 the Supreme
Court found sex a BFOQ for employment in contact positions in
all-male penitentiaries in Alabama.76 Twenty percent of the in-
carcerated men were sex offenders, and the state prisons were
permeated by violence which created a "jungle atmosphere."77 The
Court determined that hiring women would legitimately com-
promise prison safety by increasing the risk that security person-
nel might be attacked.7" In order to maintain prison security, the
essence of a security guard's job, only men could be employed and
therefore being male constituted a BFOQ for employment.7"
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Dothard does not
speak in the language of consumer preferences, the decision ex-
Id at 303.
953 F Supp at 303.
Id at 306.
, See also EEOC v Sedita, 755 F Supp 808, 811 (N D 111 1991) (holding that em-
ployer's female-only hiring policy for manager and instructor positions at a female-only
club could not be based on the privacy interests of customers, in part, because the evidence
of customer objection to male employees was inconclusive); Bohemian Club v Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Commission, 231 Cal Rptr 769, 782 (Cal App 1986) (rejecting em-
ployer's assertion of a BFOQ based on customer privacy because members of the male club
could use enclosed bathroom and shower facilities if they were truly worried about pri-
vacy).
" 433 US 321 (1977).
Id at 336-37.
Id at 334-35.
Id at 335-36.
433 US at 336-37. See also Chambers v Omaha Girls Club, Inc, 834 F2d 697 (8th
Cir 1987). In Chambers, the court held that the "role model rule" of a private social club
for girls justified a BFOQ. Id at 704-05. The rule mandated that the Club discontinue
employment of unmarried pregnant counselors. Id at 699. Employing unmarried pregnant
counselors might convey the image that the Club condoned teenage pregnancy and, in so
condoning, would thwart the Club's purpose of increasing opportunities available to young
girls. Id at 701-02. Arguably, the role model rule was grounds for a BFOQ defense be-
cause it was based on concern for young girls' welfare.
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emplifies a BFOQ justified by a consumer preference for a prod-
uct characteristic essential to the product's success in the market.
The Dothard decision justified sex as a BFOQ for prison safety;s°
prison safety is a concern of the community. The community
strongly prefers community safety and, by extension, prison
safety."1 If the prison is unable to maintain safety because it fails
to hire appropriate guards, then the prison will fail in the market
for safety. 2
As with privacy concerns, courts will recognize sex-based
BFOQ exceptions when the consumer preference for public wel-
fare is strong, but not when the strength is insufficiently demon-
strated. For instance, in Johnson Controls," the Supreme Court
emphasized that safety, in particular third party safety, only jus-
tifies sex as a BFOQ when ensuring safety is the "essence of the
business."' In that case, the Court found that the employer could
not refuse to hire fertile females since fertility was unrelated to
the job at issue: battery making. 5 Although fetal safety is an im-
portant concern, it does not justify a BFOQ defense.' The Court's
determination reflects an understanding that consumer prefer-
ences for fetal safety were not strong enough to affect the em-
ployer's continued market participation, and therefore the em-
ployer could not justify a BFOQ defense.87
3. Consumer preferences.
Most valid BFOQ defenses are based on consumer prefer-
ences for sex as justified by some other consumer preference, for
o 433 US at 336-37.
" To elaborate: if inmates can abuse prison guards, then inmates can escape more
easily, thereby subjecting the community to increased risk of crime.
' It may not be completely obvious that market forces affect prisons or that a "mar-
ket for safety" even exists; however, as discussed in the text, the consumers of the market
for safety are members of the community. Community members strongly prefer to keep
criminals behind bars, for safety reasons as well as for punishment reasons. Thus, when
prisons fail, the community will act through the political market to change the situation.
499 US 187 (1991).
Id at 202-03.
Id at 203-04.
Id.
One might argue that consumers cannot respond to the employer's hiring policies
with regards to fetal safety and thus the Court's decision does not reflect an evaluation of
the strength of the consumer preferences for safety. Perhaps, however, the consumers at
issue in Johnson Controls are the employees. Since the employees brought the suit, it is
hard to understand how their preferences for safety were strong enough to justify a dis-
criminatory hiring policy that they did not support. Moreover, it is not clear that John-
sons usual consumers would respond to knowledge of Johnson's laudable goal of protect-
ing fetuses from birth defects. If consumers do not respond, a strong consumer preference
is not demonstrated, and the hiring policy has no effect on market participation and can-
not be justified under Title VII.
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instance, a consumer preference for privacy. In rare instances
where market participation turns on consumer preference for sex,
employers can successfully establish sex-based BFOQ defenses.
For example, an employer can assert a BFOQ defense to protect
its female-only employment policy for topless dancers."
Not surprisingly, sex is generally not a BFOQ for employ-
ment as a server in a restaurant because the ability to participate
in the restaurant market does not hinge on the gender of the
waitstaff. In Levendos v Stern Entertainment, Inc,"9 the court
found that the employer's policy of hiring only male waitstaff in a
"high-class" restaurant would "frustrate the purpose of the anti-
sex discrimination statute."9 ° In disagreeing with the argument
that customer preferences demand employment of male waiters,
the court took "judicial note" of the fact that Pittsburgh's newest
hotel was formal enough to entertain the Prince of Wales despite
the employment of female waitstaff.9 1 In other words, the court
found that the alleged consumer preference for male servers did
not justify a BFOQ defense because failing to meet the preference
would not affect the employer's ability to participate in the res-
taurant market.
It is unclear whether Title VII justifies a BFOQ for employ-
ment based on foreign customers' preferences for male
employees," in part, because it is unclear how strong foreign cus-
tomers' preferences are for male employees and, more impor-
tantly, how essential meeting such preferences is to market par-
ticipation. In the only case squarely addressing the issue, Fer-
nandez v Wynn Oil Co,"3 the court determined that gender was
" See Wilson v Southwest Airlines Co, 517 F Supp 292, 301 (N D Tex 1981) (citing
New York state cases which held that being female is a BFOQ for the position of Playboy
Bunny: Saint Cross v Playboy Club, Appeal No 773, Case No CFS 22618-70 (NY Human
Rights App Bd 1971), Weber v Playboy Club, Appeal No 774, Case No CFS 22619-70 (NY
Human Rights App Bd 1971)).
" 723 F Supp 1104 (W D Pa 1989), revd on other grounds, 909 F2d 747 (3d Cir 1990).
Idat 1107.
gi Id. See also Guardian Capital Corp v New York State Division of Human Rights,
360 NYS2d 937, 938-39 (NY App Div 1974) (applying state law; finding that sex was not a
BFOQ for employment in a hotel restaurant and also finding inconclusive proffered evi-
dence that tended to show an increase in sales after the change from waiters to wait-
resses). But see id at 939-40 (Reynolds concurring) (arguing that employment in the res-
taurant, which tried to emulate the Playboy Club, should be governed by the same stan-
dards as the Playboy Club and questioning whether Playboy's immense wealth should
make a difference in judicial determination of BFOQ defenses).
See generally Note, The Biases of Customers in a Host Country as a Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification: Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 57 S Cal L Rev 335 (1984); Note,
U.S. Employers in Foreign Countries: Is Customer Preference a Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification? - Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 31 U Kan L Rev 183 (1982).
" 653 F2d 1273 (9th Cir 1981).
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not a BFOQ for a corporate vice-president position even though
the position required interacting with Latin American clients who
react negatively to women executives.94 However, the court's
statements about the BFOQ defense were in dicta. The merits of
the defense did not need to be reached - the plaintiff failed to
show a prima facie case of sex discrimination because she could
not demonstrate that she was qualified for the job.9" The court
reasoned that sex was not a BFOQ because there was "no factual
basis for linking sex with job performance"6 and thus hiring
women would not "destroy the essence" of the business.97
The most famous, and perhaps most illustrative, customer
preference BFOQ decisions involve sex-based BFOQ claims for
the position of airline attendant. The issue was first considered in
Diaz v Pan American World Airways, Inc.9" In Diaz the defen-
dants asserted, with the support of expert testimony, that women
airline attendants are better at performing the non-mechanical
aspects of the job, such as reassuring anxious passengers.99 The
court found that sex was not a BFOQ for the position of airline
attendant because "the primary function of an airline is to trans-
port passengers safely from one point to another" and thus the
non-mechanical aspects of the job were not "reasonably necessary
to the normal operation" of defendant's airline.' 0 In coming to
this conclusion, the court noted that the BFOQ exception of Title
VII was carefully drafted to prevent employers from being able to
discriminate against a group based solely on the preferences of
customers.'
Ten years after Diaz, a district court examined Southwest
Airlines' female-only flight attendant policy and found that it
violated Title VII because sex was not a BFOQ for the position.0 2
Id at 1276-77.
Id at 1275-76.
Id at 1276. In cases where the factual basis for a BFOQ defense cannot be estab-
lished, Torres v Wisconsin Dept of Health and Social Services, 859 F2d 1523, 1532 (7th Cir
1988), holds that the court should look at the "totality of the circumstances" contained in
the record to evaluate an employer's BFOQ defense.
'653 F2d at 1276; but see Avigliano v Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc, 638 F2d 552,
559 (2d Cir 1981) (holding that wholly owned Japanese subsidiary incorporated in the
United States was not exempt from Title VII and more evidence was needed to determine
whether male gender was a BFOQ for employment in management positions based on,
among other things, "acceptability to those persons with whom the company or branch
does business"), vacated on other grounds, 457 US 176 (1982).
442 F2d 385 (5th Cir 1971).
Id at 387.
10 Id at 388.
'0' Id at 389.
"02 Wilson v Southwest Airlines Co, 517 F Supp 292, 304 (N D Tex 1981).
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Southwest attempted to distinguish its situation from the earlier
claim against Pan American by showing that Southwest used sex
to market its airline:
Unabashed allusions to love and sex pervade all aspects of
Southwest's public image. Its TV commercials feature at-
tractive attendants in fitted outfits, catering to male pas-
sengers while an alluring feminine voice promises in-flight
love. On board, attendants in hot-pants (skirts are now op-
tional) serve "love bites" (toasted almonds) and "love po-
tions" (cocktails). Even Southwest's ticketing system fea-
tures a "quickie machine" to provide "instant gratifica-
tion." o3
Ultimately, the court found that, like Pan American, South-
west's primary function was to transport passengers safely. 1"
Where sex might be useful for attracting customers but is not
necessary to the essential functions of the business, no BFOQ
exists.'
Undoubtedly, the correlation between sex and the position of
flight attendant was stronger in Southwest than in Diaz, yet the
Southwest court still found that sex was not a BFOQ for employ-
ment because sex was not an essential function of the airline's
business.le Southwest failed to prove that the "customer prefer-
ence for females [was] so strong" that the airline would lose its
customers without its female-only hiring policies.0 7 The court
recognized that sex allure may have increased Southwest's prof-
itability' and that sex may even have become Southwest's
trademark.0 9 However, the airline failed to demonstrate that it
needed the female-only policy to attract customers and to partici-
pate in the market."0
Id at 294 n 4.
1G4 Id at 302.
"' Id at 304.
517 F Supp at 302.
"o Id at 303. It seems that Southwest's female-only hiring policy was based on an
inaccurate measure of consumer preferences, perhaps really equivalent to employer pref-
erences masked as consumer preferences. Consider Witt v Secretary of Labor, 397 F Supp
673, 678-79 (D Me 1975) (holding that male sex is not a BFOQ for the position of hair-
dresser because neither customer preferences nor employer preferences are an appropri-
ate basis for establishing a BFOQ).
Southwest, 517 F Supp at 302 n 25.
Id at 303-04.
"' Id at 303. In fact, in a survey of Southwest customers, "courteous and attentive
hostesses" ranked only fifth in importance behind airline features such as on time depar-
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Although the court's decision in Southwest does not speak in
terms of maximizing social value, the court's reasoning and deci-
sion reflects a desire to do so. The purpose of Title VII is to pre-
vent discrimination in employment and achievement of this goal
increases social welfare. However, this goal must be balanced
against a business's legitimate goal of competing in the market.
Thus, if sex is essential to the business, a BFOQ based on sex is
justified. But if sex is used merely to increase profitability, as
with Southwest's employment practices, then sex is not essential
to the business and permitting a sex-based BFOQ thwarts the
purpose of Title VII. and reduces social welfare.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF THE BFOQ EXCEPTION" 2
Ultimately, all BFOQ defenses are based on consumer pref-
erences. As discussed above, this includes those BFOQ defenses
found valid by various courts. Arguably, Title VII is meant to
change consumer preferences for certain employee characteristics
(such as sex) when such characteristics are not essential to the
product offered."' However, by its mere existence, the BFOQ ex-
ception demonstrates that the law was not meant to change all
consumer preferences. In certain instances, employers are per-
mitted to discriminate between employees.
The BFOQ exception allows Title VII to respond to consumer
preferences and thereby maximizes social welfare. Discrimination
in employment inflicts a social loss: it restricts the employee's
occupational opportunities and imposes an externality on other
members of society. On the other hand, discrimination in em-
ployment sometimes increases social welfare by meeting con-
sumer preferences, for instance, by providing female nurses to
elderly women. Title VII maximizes social welfare when it per-
mits employers to discriminate between employees when the so-
cial value of meeting consumer preferences outweighs the social
loss of permitting discrimination in employment. Similarly, Title
VII maximizes social welfare when it permits social losses, in the
tures, frequently scheduled departures, friendly and helpful ground personnel, and con-
venient departure times. Id at 295-96.
" 517 F Supp at 303. See also Weeks v Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co, 408
F2d 228, 234-35 (5th Cir 1969) (disapproving of an interpretation of the BFOQ exception
which would allow sex-based BFOQs where sex was "rationally related to an end which
(the employer) has a right to achieve production, profit, or business reputation").
112 For an in-depth economic analysis of the relationship between preferences
("tastes") and discrimination, see Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (Chi-
cago 1957).
.. See Diaz v Pan American World Airways, Inc, 442 F2d 385, 389 (5th Cir 1971).
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form of unmet consumer preferences, when the value of meeting
those preferences is outweighed by the value of maintaining a
discrimination-free work environment.' Finally, because the es-
sence of the business test evaluates the strength of the consumer
preference at issue, it helps identify those cases where the losses
inflicted by unmet preferences likely outweigh the benefits gained
by prohibiting the externalities of discrimination.
Conceptually, when consumers express a sufficiently strong
preference for sex, sex should no longer be looked at as a way to
discriminate among people, but as a product itself. Thus, a con-
sumer's strong preference for sex is a preference for a certain
product, and not a way to discriminate between people. For ex-
ample, it does not discriminate against an apple to buy an or-
ange.
III. THE MARKET INQUIRY: DEFINING THE PRODUCT
When a Title VII claim is brought against a business that
entails sex plus something else, evaluation of an employer's
BFOQ defense will be difficult without an in-depth inquiry into
the market in which the employer competes. A market definition
inquiry helps evaluate the "essence of the business""' and the
corresponding strength of the consumer preference for sex. As
discussed above, the different tests for evaluating BFOQ defenses
can be reconciled by an understanding that when sex defines the
product - and thus the market - of the business in question,
sex is a BFOQ for employment. Sometimes determining whether
sex plays a defining role in the market is intuitive, as with strip
clubs. Other times, determining whether sex plays a defining role
is complicated, particularly when the business combines sex plus
something else (sex as sexuality), as with the airline attendant
cases or Hooters. In the difficult cases, economics and antitrust
law can help determine the relevant product markets.
11, Id:
While we recognize that the public's expectations of finding one sex in a
particular role may cause some initial difficulty, it would be totally
anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the cus-
tomers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it
was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to over-
come.
" The author finds that the phrase the "essence of the business" best captures the
reconciliation of the different court tests. Throughout the rest of this Comment, the "es-
sence of the business" test will be used to refer to the general legal rule regarding evalua-
tion of employer BFOQ defenses. See Part I C.
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A. Price Information: What Is in a Price?
The price of a product conveys information about that prod-
uct."6 Consequently, as a first approach to determining the char-
acter of the products offered by a business allegedly violating Ti-
tle VII, an inquiry should be made into the pricing structure of
the products. What costs to consumers does the price reflect? For
what are consumers willing to pay? If consumers are willing to
pay more for a product that is sex plus the usual product, then it
seems that the legal rule should not prohibit hiring based on con-
sumer preferences. When consumers are willing to pay to fulfill
their preferences, and therefore choose specific markets based on
their preferences (as opposed to choose competitors within a sin-
gle market based on their preferences), consumer preferences
equate to market demand.
For example, in Southwest the court noted that the defendant
effectively used sex to market its product but found that sex was
not part of the product; that is, sex was not the "essence of the
business.""7 However, the court did not analyze Southwest Air-
line's pricing structure or properly define the market in which
Southwest competed. It would be interesting to find out if South-
west, before the lawsuit, charged relatively more than other air-
lines. If consumers did pay more to fly Southwest, then the
higher price may have reflected a charge for the sex of the atten-
dants in addition to the regular charge for travel. Moreover, if the
change in Southwest's employment practices caused a drop in
prices, the drop may have reflected the fact that Southwest could
no longer offer, and thus could no longer charge a fee for, sex.
Similarly, if one were to try to determine whether sex is part
of the Hooters product, one should first determine what the price
of a trip to Hooters reflects. If Hooters's prices are equal to or less
than those for a comparable meal at another restaurant, then
arguably Hooters's prices do not reflect a charge for sex. However,
if Hooters's prices are higher for comparable food, then their price
may well reflect a charge for sex.
11 For instance, a consumer considering purchasing a stereo for $5 is informed by the
price that the stereo is (probably) either (1) stolen or (2) of low quality.
.. Wilson v Southwest Airlines Co, 517 F Supp 292, 302 (N D Tex 1981) ("[T]hese non-
mechanical, sex-linked job functions are only 'tangential' to the essence of the occupations
and business involved. Southwest is not a business where vicarious sex entertainment is
the primary source provided.").
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B. Cross-Elasticities of Demand - Defining the Competition
The price inquiry is relatively easy and cheap to conduct, yet
it may ultimately convey imperfect information because it does
not factor in the elasticity of demand118 for the product in ques-
tion. For example, it may be that no matter how much a restau-
rant such as Hooters - which offers sex plus something else -
charges, consumers will never substitute away to other restau-
rants unless those restaurarits also offer sex plus something else.
If consumers will never substitute away to other restaurants,
then comparing Hooters's prices for food to a regular restaurant's
prices for food gives little useful information about what the
Hooters price entails.
Although the price analysis is flawed,"9 it is a reasonable
first inquiry into determining whether sex is a BFOQ for em-
ployment. If the price of the product does not reflect a charge for
sex then the defendant should have to show that cross-elasticities
of demand 2 demonstrate that sex defines the relevant product
market. If sex defines the product, then sex is the essence of the
business, and the employer can make employment decisions
based on sex without violating Title VII.
1. The Supreme Court's Market Definition Analysis.
The Supreme Court, through its consideration of claims un-
der the various antitrust statutes, has announced guidelines for
defining the product market in which a particular business par-
ticipates. The Court explained that the reasonable interchange-
ability of use between products, or the "cross-elasticity of de-
mand" between the product and substitutes for that product, de-
M~s In basic terms, the elasticity of demand is a measure of consumer response to
change in price. For instance, if the price of an item changes by a very small amount and
consumers respond to the price change by buying a lot less of that product or buying a
different product, then consumer response is highly elastic. Similarly, if the price of an
item is doubled, but consumers continue to buy the same amount of that item, then con-
sumer response is inelastic. For a basic introduction to economics and the concept of elas-
ticity of demand, see Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach,
265-68 (Norton 4th ed 1996).
81 One could argue that the price analysis is further flawed because, if an employer
knows that she might be charged with violating Title VII and that an inquiry into the
price of her product may be conducted, she has an incentive to charge more in order to
show that the price reflects a charge for sex. Of course, if she charges more and does not
compete in a market in which sex is essential to the product, consumers will substitute
from her product to a competitor's product.
" As discussed below, in Part III B 1, the "cross-elasticity of demand" between prod-
ucts is defined as "the extent to which consumers will change their consumption of one
product in response to a price change in another." Eastman Kodak v Image Technical
Services, Inc, 504 US 451, 469 (1992).
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fines the boundaries of a product's market.12' The "cross-
elasticity of demand" between products is "the extent to which
consumers will change their consumption of one product in re-
sponse to a price change in another."'22
2. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Guidelines for Defining Markets.
The United States Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission also offer useful guidelines for defining rele-
vant product markets."2 Like the Supreme Court's market defini-
tion analysis, the Guidelines are based on an analysis of the
cross-elasticities of demand between products. The Guidelines
define a market by trying iteratively to create a hypothetical mo-
nopoly. They do this by focusing on demand substitution factors,
that is, consumer responses to change.'24
The Guidelines define a market by determining whether im-
posing a price increase, not necessarily reflective of a cost in-
crease, is profitable to a firm.'25 If such a price increase is profit-
able then that firm enjoys a monopoly in its product market. The
analysis centers around a basic question: if a firm imposes a
"small but significant and nontransitory" price increase, for ex-
ample five percent, will consumers respond by switching to an-
other product?26 If consumers respond by substituting (or
switching) to another product, then that product should be in-
cluded in the hypothetical monopoly sphere. Next, the price in-
crease question should be asked again of all participants in the
hypothetical monopoly sphere: if the monopoly participants im-
pose a price increase, will consumers substitute away? If consum-
ers substitute, add the substitutes to the monopoly sphere and
start over. This process continues until consumers do not respond
to price increases by substituting to a different product. Once
12 Brown Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294, 325 (1962). See also PepsiCo, Inc v
The Coca-Cola Co, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 13440, *13 (S D NY).
" Eastman Kodak, 504 US at 469. See also PepsiCo, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 13440 at
*13-14.
'" ABA Antitrust Section, United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1 ("Market Definition, Measurement
and Concentration") (ABA 1992) ("Guidelines"). Although the Guidelines do not bind
courts, courts do look to them for guidance. See, for example, FTC v Staples, Inc, 970 F
Supp 1066, 1076 n 8 (D DC 1997); HTI Health Services, Inc v Quorum Health Group, Inc,
960 F Supp 1104, 1127 (S D Miss 1997) (citing Guidelines).
" See Guidelines at § 1.0.
12 Id.
'2 Id.
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consumers do not substitute in response to a price increase, the
boundaries of the market are defined.
The Guidelines can help evaluate an employer's BFOQ de-
fense because they facilitate an evaluation of the "essence of the
business" by determining market participants. The market par-
ticipants are those businesses that offer products that compete
with each other's products. Once the market participants are
known - by determining whether every market participant capi-
talizes on sex in some manner - an evaluation can be made as to
whether sex is the essence of the business, or whether sex is
merely a marketing gimmick.127 If sex is not an element of all of
the products in the market, then sex is not the "essence of the
business" and cannot be a BFOQ for employment.2 '
3. An Example: Applying Cross-Elasticities of Demand.
In FTC v Staples, Inc,'29 the court used a cross-elasticity of
demand analysis 3 ° to grant a preliminary injunction that pre-
vented a merger between Office Depot and Staples. 3' The analy-
sis proved that office superstores, such as Office Depot, Staples,
and OfficeMax (the only office superstores at the time), partici-
pated in their own relevant product market.3 2 This narrow mar-
ket was determined, in part, because the evidence showed a low
cross-elasticity of demand between office products sold by office
superstores and office products sold by other retailers of such
products, such as Wal-Mart.131 In other words, consumers do not
readily substitute office supplies bought at Wal-Mart for ones
bought at an office superstore. The evidence further showed that
in markets where only one office superstore existed, the office
superstore enjoyed a local monopoly and therefore could charge
' See, for example, Wilson v Southwest Airlines Co, 517 F Supp 292, 303 (N D Tex
1981) (explaining that sex is not a BFOQ when used as a marketing tool).
2 It should be noted that Title VII does not, on its face, aim for the most economically
efficient outcome. For instance, even if sex is not part of the product being sold, sex may,
as the court in Southwest noted, be an efficient gimmick which attracts consumers and
increases a business's market share. Title VII prohibits exploiting sex solely for the pur-
pose of attracting business, thus Title VII may result in social loss since it decreases over-
all market productivity. However, the legislators who enacted Title VII implicitly judged
that this social loss would be outweighed by the social gain obtained in maintaining a
discrimination free employment market.
970 F Supp 1066 (D DC 1997).
Id at 1074.
Id at 1093.
Id at 1079-80.
'= 970 F Supp at 1080. One witness testified that internal Wal-Mart studies showed
that where an office superstore existed in the same region as a Wal-Mart but no other
office superstore, the office superstore prices were higher than when another office super-
store was present. Id at 1077.
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higher prices without consumers substituting to office supplies
sold by other types of retailers.1
34
The Staples case shows that a business which seems to be
part of a larger market because of the product it offers may actu-
ally be part of an entirely different market, evidenced by the elas-
ticity of demand to other products.135 For example, Hooters serves
food and seems to participate in the restaurant market, but per-
haps the cross-elasticity of demand between Hooters and other
restaurants is low. If Hooters raises its prices by five percent but
its clients do not switch to a neighboring Applebee's, the indica-
tion is that Hooters and Applebee's are not participants in the
same market. Similarly, if Hooters reduces its prices to five per-
cent below the neighboring Applebee's yet Hooters fails to attract
additional clientele, the indication is that the two restaurants do
not compete in the same market.'36
C. Criticisms of the Market Approach
Although the market analysis offers a coherent method for
evaluating the essence of the business test in difficult situations
where the market combines sex plus something else, this ap-
proach is subject to some criticisms. Arguably, just because sex
defines the market in which a product competes does not mean
that sex is the "essence" of the business. Courts construe the
BFOQ exception to Title VII narrowly.'37 It follows that sex
should be required to constitute a large portion of a business be-
fore it justifies a BFOQ exception. 3 8 On the other hand, if sex
" For example, in markets where only Staples competed, Staples's prices were up to
13 percent higher than in markets where Staples competed with Office Depot and Office-
Max. Id at 1075-76. Similarly, Office Depot prices were over 5 percent higher in markets
where Office Depot was the only competitor as compared to in markets where all three
office superstores were present. Id at 1076.
" Indeed, before examining the cross-elasticities of demand, Office Depot and Staples
seemed to be a small part of the larger office supply retail market. Combined, they ac-
counted for 5.5 percent of total North American office supplies sales. 970 F Supp at 1073.
" Since cross-elasticities of demand are difficult to determine, their evaluation often
requires assessing other relevant information. For example, in Staples the court looked at
office superstore pricing when other firms were present in the geographic market and
when other firms were not present. See notes 131-32 and accompanying text. Similarly,
evaluating the relevant product market for Hooters might entail assessing whether a
Hooters located near other restaurants sets prices differently from a Hooters not located
near other restaurants. An inquiry could also be made into whether the presence of busi-
nesses offering sex as a product, such as strip bars, affects Hooters's pricing.
'" See note 38.
13 See, for example, Diaz v Pan American World Airways, Inc, 442 F2d 385, 388 (5th
Cir 1971) (requiring that sex be the "primary function" of the business in order to find an
employer's sex-based BFOQ defense valid).
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really defines the market in which a business competes, then it
must be the "essence" of the business. For instance, hypotheti-
cally, if Hooters does not compete in the same market as other
restaurants it is precisely because Hooters sells sex. Thus, sex
separates Hooters from other businesses that serve food (even if
food service constitutes a larger portion of the business than sex)
and sex is the "essence" of the business. If Hooters were required
to quit selling sex, it would only be able to continue doing busi-
ness by switching to a different market. Some may advocate an
interpretation of Title VII that allows courts to reject sex-based
BFOQs - even when sex defines the market in which the em-
ployer competes - so long as the employer can switch to another
market.139 Arguably, the "spirit" of Title VII requires this result.
However, this position is supported neither by the plain language
of Title VII, nor by existing court interpretations of the BFOQ
exception.
A second criticism of the market analysis inquiry is that it
denies the normative function of Title VII by mirroring existing
consumer preferences rather than by changing consumer prefer-
ences. By this reasoning, if Title VII is not enforced in a manner
that works to change consumer preferences for specific gender
employees, then the goal of Title VII is thwarted.14 ° Yet, as dis-
cussed previously, all BFOQ defenses are based on consumer
preferences because consumer preferences determine market par-
ticipation. Baseless consumer preferences (such as an alleged
consumer preference for male waitstaff in fancy restaurants)""
are subtly differentiated from consumer preferences that rise to
the level of market demand (such as consumer preferences for
topless female dancers)."" The language and legislative history of
the BFOQ exception to Title VII demonstrate that Title VII is not
meant to eliminate all consideration of sex in employment.4
"' Of course, it is difficult to assess whether a business can switch to another market.
For instance, what if a market to which a business can feasibly switch, given its existing
technology, is saturated?
" See Wilson v Southwest Airlines Co, 517 F Supp 292, 301 n 21 (N D Tex 1981)
(citing Diaz in support of the proposition that Title VII aims to change stereotypes about
the relative occupational abilities of different genders - a purpose that would be thwarted
by allowing consumer expectations and preferences to determine the validity of Title VII
claims).
.. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
"' See Southwest, 517 F Supp at 301 ("[I]n jobs where sex or vicarious sexual recrea-
tion is the primary service provided, e.g. a social escort or topless dancer, the job auto-
matically calls for one sex exclusively; the employee's sex and the service provided are
inseparable.").
, See Part I A-
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Court applications of the exception further show that when con-
sumer preferences rise to the level of market demand, the con-
sumer preferences at issue determine market participation, de-
fine the "essence of the business," and justify a BFOQ for em-
ployment. Although Title VII aims to abolish inequality among
sexes in the employment market, it does not aim to destroy mar-
kets in sex. This is left for another rule.
CONCLUSION
Title VII can effectively be applied to maximize social welfare
when sex defines the market in which the business participates.
The legal rule, as applied by the courts, follows this principle by
allowing sex-based BFOQs when sex is the "essence of the busi-
ness." However, when the "essence of the business" is unclear, as
when the business is a combination of sex plus something else, a
more focused analysis is necessary to determine the relevant
market in which the business in question participates. Courts
and litigants can look to antitrust law and the principles of eco-
nomics to define relevant markets. First, an inquiry should be
made into the defendant's pricing structure to see if the defen-
dant's prices reflect a charge for sex. Then, the defendant should
be required to show that the cross-elasticities of demand demon-
strate that sex defines the relevant market; such a showing
would prove that sex is essential to the business in question and
thus sex is a BFOQ for employment.

